RISK-ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONTROL FOR EXCLUSION OF UNAUTHORIZED NUCLEAR ACTIVITY
https://doi.org/10.17747/2078-8886-2014-5-82-88
Abstract
The paper examines the conditions of nuclear materials (NM) security management at the sites of nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) from non-proliferation point of view. Applied to the non-proliferation the conditions for acceptable risk were defined. The basic levels of NM control have been set. On the base of acceptable risk concept the issues of risk management were considered. The task of unacceptable risk area suppression was formulated. Requirements to the NM control effectiveness were evaluated for various scenarios of undeclared activity (inside and outside of NFC). The role of the out-of-site control in creating NM protection in-depth was demonstrated.
Keywords
detection probability,
in-site control,
out-of-site control,
significant quantity,
uranium enrichment,
technological modification of material,
diversion,
acceptable risk damage,
effectiveness of control,
nuclear non-proliferation,
nuclear materials
About the Authors
V. B. Glebov
FSBEI HPE “National Research Nuclear University MEPhI”
Russian Federation
Ph.D. in Technical Sciences, senior research assistant
Area of expertise: vulnerability analysis of nuclear materials with respect to possible unauthorized actions with them and the development of countermeasures against illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.
Moscow branch of OJSC «Nizhny Novgorod Engineering Company “Atomenergoproect”»
Russian Federation
Deputy Head of the department of business environment of commercial management
Area of expertise: analysis of problems of nuclear non-proliferation and increasing internal security of nuclear materials with respect to possible unauthorized actions with them.
Federal State-Funded Institution “Research and Development Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety”
Russian Federation
Junior research assistant of the department of safety of fuel cycle facilities
Area of expertise: gamma spectrometry of nuclear materials, neutron detectors, low-energy nuclear reactions, internal security of nuclear materials, analysis of risk in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear and radiation safety.
References
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For citations:
Glebov V.B.,
Masterov S.V.,
Kalugin N.K.
RISK-ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONTROL FOR EXCLUSION OF UNAUTHORIZED NUCLEAR ACTIVITY. Strategic decisions and risk management. 2014;(5):82-88.
(In Russ.)
https://doi.org/10.17747/2078-8886-2014-5-82-88
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